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Abstract 
Based  on  the  double  character  of  “as  if,”  it  is  argued  in  this  paper  that  “the  surplus  of  meaning”  turns  out  to  
be   “the   surplus   of   being,”   which   reveals   a   human   being   who   interprets   his   or   her   own   being   and   also  
acknowledges  this  being  as  be-­‐‑ing  at  the  same  time.  In  this  article,  1)  the  notion  of  “as  if”  is  retrieved  from  
Ricoeur’s  early  work  in  relation  to  the  “poetics  of  being”  aspired  to  by  him.  This  leads  us  to  2)  examine  the  
relation   between   the   “semantic   surplus”   and   the   “becoming   of   being.”   3)   Addressing   the   problem   of  
metaphorical   reference,   the   key   philosophical   problem   of   poetics,   is,   therefore,   inevitable.  Only   after   this  
analysis  will  we   4)   be   able   to   consider  whether   there   is   a   kind  of   “poetics   of   being”   in   the  work   of   Paul  
Ricoeur.  
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Résumé 
Tiré  du  caractère  double  de  “comme  si,”  on  pourrait  soutenir  que  “le  surplus  de  sens”  devient  “le  surplus  
de  l’être.”  Ce  surplus  révèle  un  homme  qui  se  trouve  lui-­‐‑même  dans  son  acte  interprétant,  et  comme  un  être,  
est   à   la   fois   étant   et   conscient   de   son   état   d'ʹêtre.   Cet   article   1)   récupère   la   notion   de   “comme   si”   des  
premières   oeuvres   de  Ricoeur   par   rapport   à   la   “poétique  de   l’être”   aspiré   par  Ricoeur.  Ceci   conduit   à   2)  
examiner  le  rapport  entre  “le  surplus  semantique”  et  “le  devenir  de  l’être.”  Il  semble  donc  inévitable  qu’on  
doive  3)  aborder  le  problème  de  la  référence  métaphorique,  qui  philosophiquement  est  le  problème  le  plus  
important  lié  à  la  poétique.  C’est  seulement  après  cette  analyse  que  4)  nous  sommes  capables  de  considérer  
s’il  y  a  une  certaine  “poétique  de  l’être”  dans  l’oeuvre  de  Paul  Ricoeur.  
Mots-­‐‑clés  :  poétique,  ontologie,  polysémie,  métaphore    
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In  laying  the  groundwork  for  his  much-­‐‑commented  “triple-­‐‑mimesis”  in  Time  and  Narrative  
I   –   the   mimetic   process   of   pre-­‐‑,   con-­‐‑,   and   re-­‐‑figuration   –   Ricoeur   summarizes   the   essence   of  
Aristotelian  mimesis  in  terms  of  two  complementary  aspects:  creative  imitation  and      the  space  for  
fiction.   In   short,   the   imitative-­‐‑representational   aspect   is  not   to  be   conceived  as   a   “redoubling  of  
presence”   but   as   a   shift   from   the   real   to   the   possible,   which   is   then   portrayed   in   the   poetic  
composition   of   a   plot   (mythos).   Ricoeur   argues   that   the   opening   of   the  possible   takes  place   in   a  
poet’s  work:  “The  artisan  who  works  with  words  produces  not  things  but  quasi-­‐‑things;  he  invents  
the  as-­‐‑if  (comme  si).”2  A  poet  figures  a  possible  world  while  challenging  the  real  one  with  a  tragic  
plot.  
While   developing   the   idea   of   organization   of   events   as   a   configuring   activity,   Ricoeur  
distances   himself   from   the   Aristotelian   understanding   of   mimesis,   which   is   limited   to   the  
paradigm  of  tragedy.  For  Ricoeur,  configuration/mimesis2  mediates  between  prefiguration/mimesis1  
(the   presupposed   structural,   symbolic,   and   temporal   character   of   the   world   of   action)   and  
refiguration/mimesis3   (the  appropriation  of   the   text   in   the  world  of   the   reader).3  A  connection   to  
the  “as   if”   is,  however,   retained.   In  particular,  Ricoeur  argues   that  “the  kingdom  of   the  as   if”   is  
opened  with  configurative  action,  with  the  mimetic  phase  of  “grasping  together.”4  Configuration,  
Ricoeur   maintains,   “draws   from   the   manifold   of   events   [agents,   goals,   means,   interactions,  
circumstances,  and   the   like]   the  unity  of  one   temporal  whole.”5 The  act  of  emplotment  makes  a  
story  out  of  distinct  elements.  The  Aristotelian  model  of  a  “complete  whole”  is  then  not  “radically  
altered,”   despite   the   fact   that   Ricoeur   amplifies   it   to   cover   all   literary   narratives,   and   it   also  
emphasizes  the  temporal,  episodic  feature  that  that  configuration  produces.6  
Even  though  composition,  or  configuration,  then,  has  both  an  integrating  and  a  mediating  
function,  Ricoeur  maintains  that  “emplotment  is  never  the  simple  triumph  of  order.”7 A  narrative  
–   whether   fictional   (“imaginary”)   or   historical   (“real”)   –   is   always   internally   discordant   or  
dissonant  because  it  “gives  form  to  what  is  unformed,”  as  Ricoeur  summarizes.8 The  idea  of  this  
internal   dissonance   could   well   lead   us   to   a   vicious   circle   of   “violent”   interpretation.9   The  
consonance   imposed   on   dissonance   can   give   us   “the   ‘as   if’   proper   to   any   fiction   [i.e.,   to   any  
emplotted  narrative10],”  and  still  be  a  mendacious  “literary  artifice”  based  on  “a  kind  of  nostalgia  
of  order”  in  the  face  of  its  death.11  Instead  of  reading  a  narrative  as  a  violent  cover-­‐‑up,  however,  
Ricoeur  calls  for  a  “healthy  circle”  of  discordant  concordance  and  concordant  discordance  since  it  
is   the   plot’s   very   function   to   coordinate   the   dialectic   of   dissonance   and   consonance   to   model  
human   experience.12   By   focusing   on   this   dialectic,   Ricoeur   preserves   the   delicate   duality   of  
configuration  as  both  an  ordering  and  a  discord.    
Refiguration,  the  appropriative  actualization  of  a  narrative  in  the  act  of  reading,   is  made  
possible  by  this  discordant  concordance  of  configuration.  “In  the  act  of  reading,”  Ricoeur  claims,  
“the   receiver   plays   with   the   narrative   constraints,   brings   about   gaps,   takes   part   in   the   combat  
between   the   novel   and   the   antinovel,   and   enjoys   the   pleasure   that   Roland   Barthes   calls   the  
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pleasure  of  the  text.”13  Configuration  provides  –  due  to  its  prefigurative  “anchoring”  to  symbols,  
meaningful   structures,   and   temporality14   –   a   certain   readability   (lisibilité),   which,   in   turn,  
facilitates   reception.   A   reader,   however,   is   situated   in   a   world   of   action,   and   the   reader’s  
“receptive  capacity”  is  defined  by  this  situatedness.15  The  threat  of  a  gap  between  the  horizon  of  a  
text  and  the  horizon  of  a  reader  is  avoided,  according  to  Ricoeur,  by  pointing  out  that  “language  is  
oriented   beyond   itself”;   a   narrative   “says   something   about   something.”16   Refiguration   as  
appropriation  is  the  reactualization  of  this  intention  to  say  in  the  world  of  the  reader.  
Configuration,   then,   leads  us,   through   refiguration,   to   adopt   an  ontological  perspective.  
The  postulated   ontology   of   language,   the   “ontological   presupposition   of   reference,”   arises   from  
“language’s  reflexivity  with  regard  to  itself,  whereby  it  knows  itself  as  being  in  being  in  order  to  
bear   on   being.”17   The   language   of   human   experience,   Ricoeur   argues,   presupposes   the  
transference   of   meaning   beyond   itself.   This   ontological   attestation   –   the   externalization   or  
“orientation  toward  the  extralinguistic”  –  has  its  ground,  however,  in  “our  experience  of  being  in  
the  world  and  in  time,”  and  it  proceeds  “from  this  ontological  condition  toward  its  expression  in  
language.”18 Language,  while  saying  something  about  something,  is  about  being.    
The   ontological   presupposition   of   reference   is   not   limited   to   the   descriptive   uses   of  
language.  According  to  Ricoeur,  nondescriptive  language  also  brings  “an  experience  to  language”  
and   comes,   therefore,   “into   the  world.”  By   the  use   of  metaphorical   reference,   “poetic   texts,   too,  
speak   of   the   world,   even   though   they   may   not   do   so   in   a   descriptive   fashion.”19 An   indirect  
expression   is   still   an  expression   that   reveals   a  positively  asserted  aspect  of   the  human  being-­‐‑in-­‐‑
the-­‐‑world.   Ricoeur   then   concludes   that,   in   fact,   “we   owe   a   large   part   of   the   enlarging   of   our  
horizon  of  existence   to  poetic  works.”20 Both  direct  and   indirect,  descriptive  and  nondescriptive  
languages   speak   of   the   world.   “The   world,”   Ricoeur   defines,   “is   the   whole   set   of   references  
opened   by   every   sort   of   descriptive   or   poetic   text   I   have   read,   interpreted,   and   loved.”21   All  
references   convey   an   onto-­‐‑existential   attestation.   In   sum,   it   is,   then,   in   the   “as-­‐‑if”   of   being,   in  
“being-­‐‑as”   (être-­‐‑comme),   that   a   direct   description   is   enriched   and   complemented   with   “a   full  
ontological  meaning”  of  the  figurative,  nondescriptive  references  of  poetic  diction.22  
The   thesis   of   this   paper   is   that   the   argument   for   this   ontologically   aware   approach   –  
needed  also  for  the  tenth  study  of  Oneself  as  Another  (1990)  on  ontological  commitment23  –  can  be  
found  in  Ricoeur’s  work  that  preceded  Time  and  Narrative  (1983-­‐‑85)  and  even  The  Living  Metaphor  
(1975).24 I  have,   therefore,  chosen  to  follow  Ricoeur’s  texts  closely  to  demonstrate  Ricoeur’s  own  
take  on   the   issue  rather   than  merely   to  assert  a  new  reading  of  his  works.  For  example,  Ricoeur  
maintains   in  The  Voluntary  and   the   Involuntary   (1949)25 that  “in  myth  a  philosophy  of  man  and  a  
philosophy  of   the  Whole  encounter  each  other   in  symbolization;  all  nature   is  an   immense   ‘as   if’  
(comme  si).”26 Such  quotations  are   invaluable   in   terms  of   the  goal   set   for   this  paper.  Therefore,   I  
first  address   some  key  elements   from  Ricoeur’s  earlier   texts   to  acquire   the   incipient   ideas  of   the  
“as  if.”  This  excursion  will  then  lead  us  to  an  analysis  of  the  “as  if”  at  its  proper,  ontological  level.  
This  analysis  is  carried  out  by  focusing  on  1)  semantic  surplus,  2)  metaphorical  reference,  and  3)  
concrete  reflection  as  the  poetics  of  being.    
Understanding  the  “as  if”:  Ricoeur’s  Quest  for  a  Poetics  of  Being  
It  is  well  known  that,  in  The  Voluntary  and  the  Involuntary,  Ricoeur  aspires  to  gain  a  certain  
“poetics  of  being”  –  une  ‘poétique’  de  l’être  et  de  la  volonté  dans  l’être  –  as  his  methodological  aid  in  
explaining   the   human   condition.27   The   notion   of   poetics   is   not,   however,   restricted   to   The  
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Despite  adopting  an  elaborated  approach  to  the  question  of  human  voluntarity  and  involuntarity,  
it  can  be  argued  that  The  Symbolism  of  Evil  continued  the  task  of  poetics,  but  not  only  by  recycling  
material   from  The   Voluntary   and   the   Involuntary   and   Fallible  Man   (1960).29  The   key   assertions   of  
these   preceding   works   –   that   man   dwells   in   language   and   “remains   speech”   and   that   “a  
philosophy   of  man   and   a   philosophy   of   the  Whole   encounter   each   other   in   symbolization”30   –  
function  in  The  Symbolism  of  Evil  as  a  starting  point  for  an  extended  series  of  works.31    
The  “as  if”  reappears  at  the  very  outset  of  this  series  in  relation  to  Ricoeur’s  propedeutic  
“criteriology  of  symbols.”  Briefly,  for  Ricoeur,  the  main  difference  between  a  sign  and  a  symbol  is  
that,   in   a   symbol,   there   are   two   levels   of   intentionality   instead   of   just   one.   In   a   symbol,   the  
conventional  meaning,  the  first  level  of  intentionality,  does  not  resemble  the  thing  signified.  This  
first   level   of  meaning   points   to   a   “second   intentionality,”  which   takes   the   first   intentionality   as  
“as”  or  “like”  (comme)  the  intended  symbolic  signification:  take  a  stain  on  a  cloth,  for  example,  as  a  
symbol   of   metaphysico-­‐‑ethical   defilement.   There   is,   therefore,   a   link   between   “as   if”   and   the  
symbolic   meaning.   Furthermore,   Ricoeur   points   out   that   “the   philosophical   ‘re-­‐‑enactment’”   of  
symbols   –  his  hermeneutics   of   symbols   –   echoes   this   same  “as   if.”  He  writes:   “The  philosopher  
adopts  provisionally  the  motivations  and  intention  of  the  believing  soul.  He  does  not  ‘feel’  them  in  
their   first   naïveté;   he   ‘re-­‐‑feels’   them   in   a   neutralized   mode,   in   the   mode   of   ‘as   if’.”32   A  
philosopher’s  approach  to  the  symbols  –  which  themselves  convey  the  as-­‐‑if  function  –  takes  place  
in  the  mode  of  “as  if.”  
Ricoeur  also  argues  that  symbols  that  speak  of  the  world  (cosmos)  or  of  the  experiencing  
subject   (psyche)   should   be   understood   as   poetic   images.   This   figurative   expressivity   is   another  
aspect  of  the  “as  if”  functionality.  As  much  as  “Cosmos  and  Psyche  are  the  two  poles  of  the  same  
‘expressivity’,”  this  “double   ‘expressivity’  …  has  its  complement   in  a  third  modality  of  symbols:  
poetic  imagination.”33  This  poetic  imagination  –  and  the  images  it  produces  –  is  therefore  not  just  a  
complementary   but   a   necessary   aspect   of   the   cosmic   (i.e.,   transcendent)   and   the   oneiric   (i.e.,  
subjective)   symbolisms.34   It   is   the  poetic   image   that  “places  us  at   the  origin  of   articulate  being.”  
Ricoeur  asserts  –  by  quoting  Gaston  Bachelard  in  both  The  Symbolism  of  Evil  and  On  Interpretation  
(1965)35  –  that  it  is  the  poetic  image  that  “becomes  a  new  being  in  our  language,  it  expresses  us  by  
making  us  what  it  expresses.”36  The  poetic  image  allows  the  experienced  to  be  expressed.  
It  is  not  insignificant,  however,  that  in  On  Interpretation,  Ricoeur  also  follows  Bachelard  in  
mentioning  that  “this  verb-­‐‑image,  which  runs  through  the  representation-­‐‑image,  is  symbolism.”37  
Poetic   language   expresses,   but   it   also  makes   by   speaking   out   our   experience   of   the  world   and  
ourselves.  The  poetic  image,  which  utilizes  the  “as  if”  function,  is,  therefore,  also  a  verb-­‐‑image.  The  
Symbolism  of  Evil  foreshadows  this  by  stating  that  “a  poetic  image  is  much  closer  to  a  verb  than  to  a  
portrait,”  that  the  poetic  images  are  “essentially  verbs.”38  Representation  is,  according  to  Ricoeur,  
making  the  present  rather  than  portraying  it.  
These   assertions,   which   interlink   the   as-­‐‑if   function,   poetic   language,   and   making   the  
present,  require  the  support  of  Fallible  Man.  In  it,  Ricoeur  maintains  that  there  is  a  “two-­‐‑fold  supra-­‐‑
signification”  in  verbs.  The  verb  holds  the  sentence  together  but  –   in  the  wake  of  Aristotle’s  Peri  
Hermeneias39  –  it  implies  also  “the  two  dimensions  of  truth,  existential  and  relational.”40  The  verb,  
in  other  words,   transcends   the   signified  noun-­‐‑contents,   as   it   has   the  potential   to   affirm  or  deny  
what   is  signified:   just  consider  “Socrates   is  sitting”  or  “Socrates   is  not  sitting.”41  Furthermore,   in  
clarifying   the   precise   locus   of   this   “supra-­‐‑signification,”   Ricoeur   claims   that,   although   it   is   the  
“unity  [of  the  copula  and  the  predicate]  that  supra-­‐‑signifies,”42  there  is  an  ontologically  affirmative  
“vehemence  of  the  Yes  which  has  for  a  correlate  the  ‘is’  that  is  signified  –  or,  to  be  more  precise,  
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
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supra-­‐‑signified.”43   In  brief,   it   is  with   regard   to   Socrates   that   sitting   is   affirmed   in   the   statement,  
“Socrates  is…”  The  verb,  and  especially  the  copula,  is  affirmative  with  regard  to  its  subject.    
While   beginning   this   preparatory   analysis   with   the   notion   of   “as   if,”   we   have   now  
achieved   the   idea   of   copula   that   “supra-­‐‑signifies”   –   the   existential   and   relational   levels   of  
signification  are  then  brought  to  our  attention.  Hence,  three  special  features  of  Ricoeur’s  thought  
can   be   retrieved   from   his   early   works:   a)   the   “as   if”   function   in   affiliation   with   a   symbolic  
expression   calls   for   philosophical   reflection,   b)   symbols   carrying   this   “as   if”   function   are   to   be  
conceived  as  poetic  images,  and  c)  all  these  relate  to  verbs  and  especially  to  the  copula  “is,”  which  
carries  an  onto-­‐‑existential  signification.    
The   notion   of   the   verb   is,   therefore,   requires   an   analysis   of  The   Living  Metaphor,   which  
clarifies  the  problem  of  metaphorical  reference,  particularly  with  respect  to  the  question  of  being  
and  to  the  copula  “is.”44  The  question  of  metaphors  as  a  means  of  the  “indirect  language”  of  one’s  
existence  was  addressed  in  The  Voluntary  and  the  Involuntary.45  After  Ricoeur’s  “wager”  –  i.e.,  after  
the  methodological   shift   from   existentially   informed   phenomenology   to   ontologically   informed  
hermeneutics   of   symbols46   –   the  metaphor   theory  plays,   however,   a   significant   role   in   ensuring  
that   philosophical   rigor   is   maintained   with   regard   to   understanding   the   nature   of   equivocal  
language.   In   other   words,   after   the   hermeneutic   wager,   a   linguistic   turn   was   needed.   The  
metaphor  theory  helps  explain  why  the  turn  to  the  philosophy  of  language  was  necessary.  
The  need  can  be  drawn  directly   from  The  Symbolism  of  Evil.  Ricoeur  argues   in   it   that   the  
task  of  philosophical  hermeneutics   is   “to  elaborate   existential   concepts  –   that   is   to   say,  not  only  
structures   of   reflection   but   structures   of   existence,   insofar   as   existence   is   the   being   of   man.”47  
Ricoeur  maintains  that  the  cogito  does  not  subsist  but  finds  itself  within  being.  This  call  for  post-­‐‑
critical   ontology   leads   one   to   assume   that   symbols   have   an   ontological   function,   which   in   the  
language  of  The  Symbolism  of  Evil  can  be  described  as  “an  appeal  by  which  each  man  is  invited  to  
situate  himself  better  in  being.”48  Symbols,  Ricoeur  insists,  “speak  of  the  situation  of  the  being  of  
man  in  the  being  of  the  world.”49  Symbols,  then,  are  expressions  of  being,  and  their  hermeneutics  
is  a  means  of  opening  up  this  language  of  human  beings’  ontological  situatedness.  
Semantic  Surplus  and  the  Becoming  of  Being  
The  same  question  of  the  onto-­‐‑existential  “fullness  of  language”  animates  Ricoeur’s  efforts  
in  The  Living  Metaphor  but  from  the  perspective  of  philosophical  speculation  –  the  question  now  is  
how   to   elaborate   these   existential   concepts,   leading   to   the   use   of   such   linguistic   terms   as  
“polysemy”   and   “semantic   innovation.”   Ricoeur   argues   that   the   “semantic   surplus”   or   “the  
surplus   of  meaning”   of   a  metaphor   produces   correlates,   however,  with   “the   surplus   of   being.”  
This  concept  of  the  surplus  of  being  reveals  a  human  being  who  interprets  his  or  her  own  being  
and   acknowledges   also   being   as   be-­‐‑ing   at   the   same   time.   Ricoeur’s   theory   of   metaphors   is,  
therefore,  studied  here,  especially  from  the  perspective  of  their  relation  to  being.    
The  Living  Metaphor  states  that  language  has  a  reflective  capacity  that  relates  to  being,  from  
which   the   notion   arises   that   “something   must   be   for   something   to   be   said.”50   This   ontological  
assertion  is,  furthermore,  strengthened  by  a  demand  that,  for  a  language  to  signify,  it  needs  such  a  
function  –  revealed  by  speculative  discourse  –  that  grounds  the  referential  function  ontologically:  
Language  designates  itself  and  its  other.  This  reflective  character  
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articulates  it  in  another  discourse,  speculative  [i.e.,  philosophical]  
discourse.   It   is   then  no   longer  a   function   that  can  be  opposed   to  
other   functions,   in   particular   to   the   referential   function;   for   it   is  
the  knowledge  that  accompanies  the  referential  function  itself,  the  
knowledge  of  its  being-­‐‑related  to  being.51  
Language   itself   calls   for   reflection   and   ontological   situatedness.   To   fully   understand   the  
implications  of  this  statement,  it  is  necessary  to  highlight  Ricoeur’s  basic  arguments  in  relation  to  
metaphors.  
Ricoeur  studies  the  metaphorical  use  of  language  by  placing  it  in  a  dialectical  process.  At  
the   theoretical   level,  Ricoeur  proceeds   from  semiotics   to  semantics  and,   finally,   to  hermeneutics.  
At  the  level  of  metaphorical  statements,  he  proceeds  from  a  word  to  a  sentence  and  to  language  
per  se.52  Moreover,  Ricoeur  places  the  substitutive  “word”  and  contextual  “interaction”  theories  in  
a  dialectical  relationship.  For  Ricoeur,  these  theories  form  a  dialectic  pair  that  reflects  the  totality  
of  the  problematics  of  language.53  At  the  same  time,  Ricoeur  aims  to  bridge  the  theories  by  placing  
the  metaphor   in   connection  with   both   a   substituted  word   and   a   sentence   (i.e.,   its   context).   This  
becomes   possible   when   the   relationship   between   a   word   and   its   context   are   seen   from   the  
viewpoint  of  polysemy.  With  this  term,  Ricoeur  means  certain  semantic  elasticity  or  expandability  
of  discourse,  namely   its   capacity   to  “acquire  new  significations  without   losing   their  old  ones.”54  
Language,  Ricoeur  argues,  is  semantically  elastic.  
The   polysemic   character   of   language   is   itself   not   a   metaphor,   but   it   can   be   seen   as   a  
necessary  condition  for  one  to  occur.  A  word,  any  word,  already  has  some  “semantic  capital”  but  
is  also  open  to  new  significations.  In  its  use,  it  is  adjusted  and  fixed  semantically  in  relation  to  its  
context.  In  other  words,  Ricoeur  is  willing  to  argue  that  connecting  a  word  to  a  sentence  alters  it  to  
a  process  by  which  the  semantic  potential  of  the  word  is  actualized  in  full  and  then  limited  by  the  
context  to  such  a  signification  that  renders  the  discourse  meaningful.  The  context  –  a  sentence,  a  
discourse  –  then  works  “playfully”  as  a  limiting  semantic  apparatus.55    
This  interplay  between  a  word  and  its  context  has  two  diverging  directions.  In  a  process  
that  can  be  called  “univocization,”  the  sentence  achieves  meaningfulness  by  limiting  the  “semantic  
capital”  of  its  words  in  such  a  way  that  the  semantic  potential  of  each  word  is  “eliminated”  to  one  
acceptation,  which  makes   it   compatible  with   the  newly   formed  meaning  of   the  whole   sentence.  
Consider,   for   example,   the   sentence   “Socrates   is   a  wise  man.”   But   in   the   case   of   a  metaphor   –  
which   Ricoeur   understands   as   “a   semantic   event   that   takes   place   at   the   point   where   several  
semantic   fields   intersect”56   –   this   process   can   be   understood   as   inverse:   there   are   no   suitable  
potential  senses  that  would  make  the  expression  meaningful.  We  can  consider,  then,  the  sentence  
“Socrates  is  a  stingray.”57  For  Ricoeur,  this  implies  that  “it  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  retain  all  the  
acceptations   allowed   plus   one,   that  which  will   rescue   the  meaning   of   the   entire   statement.”58   A  
signification  needs  to  be  added  to  achieve  a  meaningful  expression.  In  this  “metaphorization”  or  
“equivocization,”  the  context  produces  a  semantic  surplus  that   then  leads  to  the  meaningfulness  
of  the  entire  expression.    
Now,  how  could  the  “as  if”  function  and  the  notion  of  the  “poetic  image”  be  explained  by  
this?   In   sum,   a   metaphor   illustrates   semantic   creativity,   the   ability   to   produce   new   meanings,  
which  –  according   to  The  Living  Metaphor   –   is   connected   to   the  “iconic  character”  of  metaphor.59  
The  “as  if,”  Ricoeur  argues,  is  connected  both  to  “saying  as”  and  “seeing  as.”  This  iconicity,  then,  
also   has   its   correlate   in   poetic   praxis.   Ricoeur   states   that   “thinking   in   poetry   is   a   picture-­‐‑
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
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thinking.”60  This  means,  for  example,  that  a  poet  “is  that  artisan  who  sustains  and  shapes  imagery  
only  by  a  play  of   language.”61  Poetic   images  rest  on   the  polysemic  character  of   language,  which  
becomes  figurative  speech  by  using  its  “as  if”  function  also  in  the  mode  of  “seeing  as.”  
A  shift  from  polysemy  to  poetic  images  and  “seeing  as”  leads  us  to  consider  its  ontological  
import.   According   to   Ricoeur,   who   at   this   point   draws   both   from   Kant’s   schematism   and  
especially   from   later  Wittgenstein,   the   pictorial   capacity   of   language   (i.e.,   “seeing   as”)   is,   first,  
related   to   reception.   Anticipating   the   refigurative   aspect   of   the   threefold   mimesis,   Ricoeur  
announces  that  the  “seeing  as”  is  exposed  in  the  act  of  reading.62  The  semantics  of  a  metaphorical  
expression   is,   therefore,   reaching   its   limits   and   about   to   turn   to   hermeneutics.   In   addition,   the  
question   of   being   arises   in   connection   with   the   metaphorical   statement   as   an   image   inviting  
interpretation.  On  Interpretation,  however,  states   that   interpretation  and  reflection  coincide.63   It   is  
the  poetic  image  that  opens  up  the  whole  sphere  of  being  while  discovering  it  in  reflection.    
Using  once  again  the  words  of  Gaston  Bachelard’s  The  Poetics  of  Space  (1957),  Ricoeur  then  
argues  in  The  Living  Metaphor  that  there  is  a  direct  relation  between  poetic  images  and  reflection  on  
being:    
Bachelard   has   taught   us   that   the   image   is   not   a   residue   of  
impression,   but   an   aura   surrounding   speech:   “The  poetic   image  
places   us   at   the   origin   of   the   speaking   being.”   The   poem   gives  
birth   to   the   image;   the   poetic   “becomes   a   new   being   in   our  
language,  expressing  us  by  making  us  what  it  expresses;  in  other  
words,  it  is  at  once  a  becoming  of  expression,  and  a  becoming  of  
our  being.  Here  expression  creates  being  (l’expression  crée  de  l’être)  
…   one   would   not   be   able   to   meditate   in   a   zone   that   preceded  
language.”64  
The  profundity  of  existence  is  disclosed  in  a  poetic  statement  that  works  as  a  metaphorical  image.  
Since  the  poetic  image  also  brings  together  the  cosmic  and  the  oneiric  aspects  of  this  expressivity,  
it  is  most  fundamentally  “a  becoming  of  our  being,”  which  is  better  understood  as  a  “processual  
event”   of   becoming   (more)   self-­‐‑conscious   of   one’s   own   being.   “The   function   of   ‘semantic  
innovation’,”   Richard   Kearney   summarizes   while   analyzing   Ricoeur’s   hermeneutics   of   poetic  
imagination,   “is   therefore,   in   its   most   fundamental   sense,   an   ontological   event”   –   or   “the  
ontological  paradox  of  creation-­‐‑as-­‐‑discovery.”65  This  “paradox”  of  the  becoming  of  being  asks  for  a  
hermeneutical  approach  but  also  opens  the  possibility  of  an  existentially  significant  ontology.  
Metaphorical  Reference  as  a  Key  to  Ontological  Affirmation  
The  notions  of  “as   if”  and  “poetic   image”  seem   to   leave  us  empty-­‐‑handed   in  a  way  not  
intended  by  Ricoeur.  When  he  alludes   to   the  “pictorial”  capacity  of  poetic   language,   the   idea  of  
referential   relation   seems   to   get   lost.   It   appears   that   a  poetic   image   can  have   a   quasi-­‐‑referential  
relation  only  to  language  itself:  “Like  sculpture,  poetry  converts  language  into  matter,  worked  for  
its  own  sake.  This  solid  object  is  not  the  representation  of  some  thing,  but  an  expression  of  itself.”66  
Ricoeur,   however,   clarifies   his   understanding   of   a   poetic   discourse   by   introducing   three  
statements  with   regard   to   its   nature:   “[first,]   in   the  metaphorical   discourse   of   poetry   referential  
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road  to  redescription;  and  [third,]  reality  brought  to  language  unites  manifestation  and  creation.”67  
Ricoeur,  in  other  words,  redefines  the  notion  of  referential  relation  in  poetic  language.    
Ricoeur  then  argues  that  the  question  of  metaphorical  reference  is  the  most  important  one  
in  The   Living  Metaphor.68   The   idea   of   the   rhetorical   process   of   poetic   discourse,   understood   as   a  
power  of  words  unleashed  to  redescribe  reality,  urges  philosophical  clarification.  Metaphor  theory  
works  as  an  instrument  in  explaining  how  this  redescription  comes  about.  Ricoeur  maintains  that  
a   metaphor   simulates   poetic   discourse:   “with   respect   to   the   relation   to   reality,   metaphor   is   to  
poetic   language  what   the  model   is   to   scientific   language.”69   Furthermore,   in   light   of   creation   as  
discovery,  a  metaphorical  reference  models  the  ontologically  heavy  reference  of  a  poetic  discourse.  
Ricoeur  writes:  “In  service  to  the  poetic  function,  metaphor  is  that  strategy  of  discourse  by  which  
language  divests  itself  of  its  function  of  direct  description  in  order  to  reach  the  mythic  level  where  
its   function   of   discovery   is   set   free.”70   Put   differently,   a   metaphor   is   a   step   away   from   direct  
description,  but  it  facilitates  the  discovery  of  the  surplus  of  being  in  its  surplus  of  meaning.  It  is,  
therefore,  possible  to  “presume  to  speak  of  metaphorical  truth  in  order  to  designate  the  ‘realistic’  
intention   that   belongs   to   the   redescriptive   power   of   poetic   language.”71   An   analysis   of  
metaphorical  reference  results  in  the  notion  of  ontologically  affirmative  redescription.  
This   redescription,   however,   already   entails   tension   at   the   semantic   level   of   metaphor.  
Ricoeur  locates  the  three  types  of  semantic  tension  between  a)  the  “focus”  (word)  and  the  “frame”  
(sentence)  of  a  metaphorical  statement,  b)  literal  and  metaphorical  interpretations,  and  c)  between  
identity  and  difference  in  the  relational  function  of  the  metaphorical  copula.  It  is  the  last  one  that  
Ricoeur  takes  as  the  most  significant.72  In  the  introduction  to  The  Living  Metaphor,  Ricoeur  asserts  
that  the  idea  of  metaphorical  truth  is,  in  itself,  admissible,  but  only  as  tensional  because  of  its  seat  
in  the  tensional  copula:  
By   linking   fiction   and   redescription   in   this   way,   we   restore   the  
full  depth  of  meaning  to  Aristotle’s  discovery  in  the  Poetics,  which  
was   that   the   poiêsis   of   language   arises   out   of   the   connection  
between  muthos   and  mimêsis.   From   this   conjuction  of   fiction  and  
redescription   I   conclude   that   the   “place”   of   metaphor,   its   most  
intimate   and   ultimate   abode,   is   neither   the   name,   nor   the  
sentence,  nor  even  discourse,  but  the  copula  of  the  verb  to  be.  The  
metaphorical  “is”  at  once  signifies  both  “is  not”  (“n’est  pas”)  and  
“is  like”  (“est  comme”).  If  this  is  really  so,  we  are  allowed  to  speak  
of   metaphorical   truth,   but   in   an   equally   “tensive”   sense   of   the  
word  “truth.”73  
In   other  words,   the   possibility   for   a  metaphorical   truth   –   as   tensional   truth   –   is   opened   by   the  
copula  “is”  in  its  double  function  of  identity  and  difference.  
The  analysis  undertaken  at  the  semantic  level  of  metaphor  is  not,  however,  sufficient.  As  
pointed   out   in   the   Fallible   Man,   the   copula   is   not   just   relational   but   also   existential.74   This  
existential  character  of  its  expressiveness  is  derived  from  “ontological  vehemence,”  which  Ricoeur  
relates   to   ontological   attestation.   “To   state   ‘that   is’,”  Ricoeur  maintains,   “such   is   the  moment   of  
belief,   of   ontological   commitment.”75   By   focusing   again   on   the   ontologically   affirmative   side   of   the  
copula,  Ricoeur  then  holds  that,  rather  than  anything  else,  redescription  concerns  being:    
In   the   most   radical   terms   possible,   tension   must   be   introduced  
into   metaphorically   affirmed   being.   When   the   poet   says   that  
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
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“nature   is  a   temple  where   living  columns…”  the  verb   to  be  does  
not  just  connect  the  predicate  temple  to  the  subject  nature  along  the  
lines  of  the  threefold  [semantic-­‐‑relational]  tension  outlined  above.  
The  copula  is  not  only  relational.  It   implies  besides,  by  means  of  
predicative   relationship,   that  what   is   is   redescribed;   it   says   that  
things  really  are  this  way.76  
Even  if  the  metaphorical  truth  is  tensional,  it  is  still  ontologically  affirmative  in  terms  of  the  world  
that  it  redescribes.  The  trait  of  ontological  naïveté  is  preserved  in  the  dialectic  of  “is  like”  and  “is  
not,”  which   in   itself   is   brought   to   our   attention   in   the   analysis   of   the   relational   function   of   the  
metaphorical  copula.    
I  argue   that,  at   its  onto-­‐‑existential   level,   the  redescription  concerns  “the  being  of  human  
being  in  the  being  of  the  world”  as  in  the  case  of  symbols.77  The  onto-­‐‑existential  function  of  copula  
is   linked   directly   to   the   ontologically   affirmative   “vehemence,”   to   the   belief   that   something   is  
redescribed.  The  importance  of  this  theme  is  highlighted  in  the  fact  that  Ricoeur  also  examines  the  
idea  of  ontological  commitment   in   the  concluding  study  of  Oneself  as  Another.78  But   to  remain   in  
the  context  of  The  Living  Metaphor,  I  also  maintain  that  the  threshold  of  semantics  has  been  reached  
with  Ricoeur’s  ontological  analysis  of  redescription.  The  copula  states,  by  means  of  the  predicative  
relationship,   that   things   are   the   way   they   are   expressed   –   based   on   a   specific   metaphorical  
modality  “to  be  like”  (être-­‐‑comme).  This  modality  bears  a  tension  that  prevails  between  “is”  and  “is  
not”   even   in   this   equivalent   use   of   the   verb.   As   such,   the   verb   “to   be”   is   dialectical;   it   is   an  
expression  both  of   the  ontological  naïveté  of  “is   like”  and  of   the  critical  approach  of  “is  not”   (la  
démythisation).   For   Ricoeur,   metaphorical   truth   is   then   “tensional”   as   well   as   paradoxical;   it   is  
dialectic  truth  between  being  the  same  and  being  other.79    
If  I  am,  then,  stressing  the  ontological  pole  of  the  dialectic,  Eugene  Kaelin  points  out  that  
the  dialectic  truth  rests  on  the  critical  “is  not,”  without  which  the  notion  of  poetic  meaning  is  not  
understandable.  “Without  the  accompanying  ‘is-­‐‑not’  the  resemblance  or  iconicity  of  the  metaphor  
has  no  meaning,  and  without  the  interpretation  of  the  ‘is’  as  an  ‘as  if’,  the  poem  cannot  negotiate  
any  transfer  of  meaning,”  Kaelin  states.80  “It  follows,”  he  concludes,  “that  the  truth  communicated  
through   poetry   cannot   be   literal,   but   yet   must   still   be,   in   some   sense,   ‘metaphysical’.”81   By  
highlighting  the  “metaphysical”  notion  of  metaphorical  truth,  Kaelin  alludes  to  the  final  study  of  
The   Living  Metaphor   in   which   Ricoeur   examines   the  metaphysical   implications   of   metaphors   in  
Aristotle,   Aquinas,   Heidegger,   and   Derrida.82   Ricoeur,   however,   also   clarifies   his   own   account.  
While  Ricoeur  undertakes  two  tasks,  namely  that  of  erecting  “a  general  theory  of  the  intersection  
between   [the   speculative   and   poetic]   spheres   of   discourse”   and   that   of   proposing   “an  
interpretation  of  the  ontology  implicit  in  the  postulates  of  metaphorical  reference”;83  the  latter  is  of  
particular  interest  to  me  as  it  preveniently  responds  to  Kaelin’s  criticism.    
Kaelin   admits   himself   that,   instead   of   “metaphysical,”   Ricoeur   “prefers   the   term  
‘ontological’.”84  Ricoeur’s  notion  of  “dialectic  truth,”  however,  implies  that  both  the  naïve  thesis  of  
an  immediate  ontology  and  the  inevitably  relativist  Wittgensteinian  thesis  of  the  heterogeneity  of  
language  games  are  rejected.85  Ricoeur  wishes  to  ground  his  own  analysis  in  the  idea  that  “every  
gain   in  meaning   is   at   once   a   gain   in   sense   and   a   gain   in   reference.”86   In   other  words,   Ricoeur  
argues   for   a   surplus   of   being   in   the   surplus   of  meaning   based   on   “semantic   dynamism”   in   the  
circularity  of  sense  and  reference.  In  a  metaphor,  the  meaning  “goes  beyond”  the  established  field  
of  references.  Approached  from  the  side  of  reference,  in  turn,  the  “semantic  aim”  (visée  semantique)  
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metaphorical   expression   –   carries   an   “ontological   vehemence”   directed   toward   the   second,  
“unknown”   referential   field   of   meaning.87   Ricoeur   states   that   “ontological   vehemence   cuts  
signification  from  its  initial  anchor,  frees  it  as  the  form  of  a  movement  and  transposes  it  to  a  new  
field   to  which   the   signification   can   give   form   by  means   of   its   own   figurative   property.”88   It   is,  
therefore,  understandable  why  Ricoeur  prefers  the  term  “ontological”  rather  than  “metaphysical”  
–  a  concrete  experience  of  being  a  human  being  in  the  world  seeks  to  express  itself.    
The  asserted  ontological  vehemence  leads  us  to  examine  language  and  the  world  as  well  
as  the  relationship  between  the  two.  Ricoeur’s  analysis  of  the  relation  of  language  to  reality  poses  
again  the  general  question  of  metaphorical  reference.  This  question,  however,  extends  far  beyond  
linguistic   problems.   Language,   for   Ricoeur,   appears   “as   that  which   raises   the   experience   of   the  
world   to   its   articulation   in   discourse,   that   which   founds   communication   and   brings   about   the  
advent  of  man  (fait  advenir  l’homme)  as  speaking  subject.”89  In  brief,  language  articulates  the  human  
experience  of  being  in  the  world.  Ricoeur  conceives  semantics,  then,  in  a  Humboldtian  manner  as  
a   philosophy   of   language   because   it   examines   the   relation   “between   being   and   being-­‐‑said.”90  
Ricoeur   argues   that   this   “examination”   is  made   possible   by   the   reflective   capacity   of   language,  
that  is,  its  ability  to  consider  itself  by  the  means  of  distanciation:  “Language  designates  itself  and  
its  other.”91  While  signifying,  language  refers  to  the  world.    
It  follows  from  this  reflective  capacity,  which  links  language  to  the  world,  that  there  is  a  
peculiar   ontological   “knowledge”   inherent   in   the   referential   function   itself   –   that   it   is   “being-­‐‑
related   to   being.”92   Although   Ricoeur   does   not   use   this   terminology,   the   knowledge-­‐‑bearing  
function   revealed   in   reflection   can,   therefore,   be   understood   as   the   cogito   of   the   language   itself.  
Ricoeur  mentions  that  language  is  “installed”  in  being  and  that  it  “becomes  aware  of  itself  in  the  
self-­‐‑articulation  of  the  being  which  it  is  about.”93  But  this  notion  of  being  “aware”  of  being,  which,  
in   a   way,   inverts   referential   relation,94   goes   indeed   further   as   it   yields   to   extra-­‐‑linguistic  
“knowledge”  and  even  grounds  itself  in  this  extra-­‐‑linguistic  status  when  “moving”  from  being  to  
language:  
When  I  speak,  I  know  that  something  is  brought  to  language.  This  
knowledge   is   no   longer   intra-­‐‑linguistic   but   extra-­‐‑linguistic;   it  
moves   from  being   to   being-­‐‑said   (de   l’être   à   l’être-­‐‑dit),   at   the   very  
time   that   language   itself   moves   from   sense   to   reference.   Kant  
wrote:   “Something   must   be   for   something   to   appear.”   We   are  
saying:  “Something  must  be  for  something  to  be  said.”95  
Ricoeur   states,   then,   that   it   is   the   “surplus   of   being”   that   asks   for   a   corresponding   “surplus   of  
meaning,”  revealed  in  an  act  of  speech.  Instead  of  language  referring  to  the  world,  Ricoeur  argues  
that  it  is  the  world  that  speaks  out  its  being.  
A   question   remains,   however,   if   it   is   also   the   case   that   this   just-­‐‑achieved   ontological  
understanding   is   attainable   only   in   and  with   the   speculative   discourse   because   the   ontological  
vehemence   becomes   apparent   only   in   speculative   distanciation.   Although   one   could   applaud  
Ricoeur  for  reaching  the  level  of  his  anticipated  Poetics,  Ricoeur  warns  that  the  speculative  by  no  
means  becomes  poetic.96  For  Ricoeur,  the  speculative  philosophical  discourse  must  remain  distinct  
from  the  poetic  one  precisely  because  of  its  self-­‐‑reflective  character.  Hence,  the  “extra-­‐‑linguistic”97  
is  only  pointed  at   in  speculative  discourse  by  noticing  it   in  speech  itself,   that   is,   in  “discourse  as  
use.”  This  stance,  however,   is  distinct   from  taking   language  as  a  closed  system  since   the  “extra-­‐‑
linguistic”  cannot  be  achieved  directly.98  When  noticing  that  actuality  –  in  which  Ricoeur  includes  
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
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all   its  possibilities   through  an  interplay  between  the  actual  and  possible99  –  has  meaning  only   in  
the   speculative  discourse   concerning  being,  Ricoeur  points   out   that   “the  polysemy  of   being”   (la  
polysémie   de   l’être)   signifies   the   ultimate   reference   of   poetic   discourse,   although   this   can   be  
articulated  only  in  a  speculative  discourse.100    
It   is,   then,   necessary   to   conclude   that   the   poetic   and   the   speculative   are   in   a   dialectical  
relationship  with  each  other:  the  poetic  leads  us  to  recognize  a  certain  tension  of  being  (“being-­‐‑as”  
conceived  as  the  same  and  the  other),  whereas  the  speculative  construes  this  tension  critically.101  It  
appears  that,  while  criticizing  but  also  borrowing  from  both  Aristotle  and  Heidegger,  Ricoeur  has  
reached   the   threshold   of   a   postcritical   “first   philosophy,”   namely   a   philosophy   that   would  
illustrate  the  ontological  in  referential  relation.102    
The   fact   that   Ricoeur   clearly   wishes   to   find   an   affinity   with   a   kind   of   metaphysics   of  
concrete   presence   à   la   Gabriel   Marcel103   does   not,   however,   necessarily   lead   to   our   being   held  
captive   by   this   “presencing.”  Ricoeur   strives   to  understand,   to   “hear   anew”   as  he   insists   in  The  
Symbolism  of  Evil,  but  this  “hearing”  takes  place  only  in  the  conflict  of  interpretations.104  If  there  is  
a  possibility  of  a  regained  presence,  it  is  only  hermeneutical  in  a  postcritical  sense  and  not  directly  
appropriable  by  any  means.  This  distinguishes  Ricoeur’s  approach  from  those  of  romanticists  and  
certain   existentialists   –   for   example,   there   is   a   difference   between  Ricoeur’s   “metaphorical   ‘as’”  
and  Heidegger’s  “hermeneutic  ‘as’.”105  The  fidelité  and  disponibilité  Ricoeur  is  searching  for  pertain  
to  “ontological  vehemence,”  but   the  awareness  of   this  openness   to  being   is  attainable  only   from  
the  critical  distance  of  speculation.  
The   possibility   of   a   “regained”   presence   remains,   however.   In   his   own   reading   of  
Ricoeur’s   imago-­‐‑poetics,   Richard   Kearney   asserts:   “An   understanding   of   the   possible   worlds  
uncovered  by  the  poetic  imagination  also  permits  a  new  understanding  of  ourselves  as  beings-­‐‑in-­‐‑
the-­‐‑world.”106   Poetic   expressions   can   be   called   authentic   because   they   are   instances   of   onto-­‐‑
existential   discovery,   which,   in   turn,   calls   for   immediate   interpretation.   This   discovery   is   most  
essentially   about   being   that   is   already   present,   with   its   possibilities,   and   is   by   no   means  
postulated.  In  Ricoeur’s  words  –  which  explain  the  phrase  la  métaphore  vive,  the  living  metaphor  –  
“Lively   expression   is   that  which   expresses   the   living   existence.”107   To   use   language   that   is  more  
traditionally  metaphysical,  in  a  lively  expression,  the  possibilities  of  the  living  existence  emerge  as  
actual.   This   is   the   “ontological   function   of   metaphorical   discourse,   in   which   every   dormant  
potentiality   of   existence   appears   as   blossoming   forth   every   latent   capacity   for   action   as  
actualized”108  –  a  presence  regained.  
Although  produced  by  a  need   to  explicate  an  aspect  of  being   in   some  new  kind  of  way  
that  seems  to  provide  an  appropriate  description  of   that  experience,  a   living  metaphor   is  still  an  
expression   that   operates   within   language.   The   preceding   analysis   has   been   important   in  
explicating   the  semantic  “surplus,”  which  calls   for  a  “surplus  of  being.”  Understanding  a   living  
metaphor  as  a  model  in  this  sense  for  a  poetic-­‐‑speculative  account  is  valuable  because  it  clarifies  
the  initial  problematic,  namely  that  of  onto-­‐‑poetic  utterances.  As  mentioned  above,  Ricoeur  himself  
asks  for  this   in  The  Voluntary  and  the  Involuntary:  “A  genuine  Transcendence  is  more  than  a  limit  
concept:   it   is   a   presence   which   brings   about   a   true   revolution   in   the   theory   of   subjectivity;   it  
introduces  into  it  a  radically  new  dimension,  the  poetic  dimension.”109  Ricoeur’s  conviction  is  that  
poetic   language   introduces   and   expresses   being.   This   leads   us   already   to   think   as   if   there   is   a  
poetics   of   being   in   Ricoeur’s   work.   This   “as   if”   leads   us   to   the   final   step   in   our   analysis,   to  
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Poetics  of  Being  and  Concrete  Reflection  
To  open  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  theorizing  the  “poetics  of  being,”  I  suggest  that  
the  theory  of  “authentic”  or  living  metaphors  has  a  mutual  connection  to  the  level  of  symbols  that  
Ricoeur   calls   tertiary   symbols.110   In   The   Symbolism   of   Evil,   Ricoeur   addresses   the   question   of  
juxtaposing  philosophical  reflection  and  speculative  symbols,  the  “tertiary  symbols,”  that  interpret  
the  experience  of  being  by  rationalizing  it  –  as,  for  example,  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  rationalizes  
the   experience   of  moral   impurity.111   In   addition,   Ricoeur’s   1976   text   Interpretation   Theory   asserts  
that   the  metaphor   theory   is   capable  of   enriching  our  understanding  of   the   symbolic   function  of  
language.112  It  is,  therefore,  feasible  to  assume  that  the  metaphor  theory  clarifies  Ricoeur’s  analyses  
on   symbols   and   that   the   symbol   theory   provides   an   argumentative   context   for   the   question   of  
metaphors.  
Ricoeur  maintains   that   even   though   symbols  differ   from  metaphors   –  which  are  merely  
“saying-­‐‑as,”   “seeing-­‐‑as,”   or   “being-­‐‑as”   –   in   their   capacity   to   truly   reveal   and   express   the   extra-­‐‑
linguistic  reality,113  the  relationship  between  metaphors  and  symbols  is  mutually  beneficial.  First,  a  
metaphor  models  the  “semantic  surplus,”  which  also  takes  place  in  every  symbol.  This,  however,  
does  not  mean  that  they  are   indistinguishable.  According  to  Ricoeur,  metaphors  exceed  symbols  
because  of  their  capacity  to  explain  the  semantic  structure  of  symbols.  Symbols,  on  the  other  hand,  
exceed   metaphors   due   to   their   partially   non-­‐‑semantic   character.   Ricoeur   defines   metaphors   as  
purely  linguistic  procedures,  whereas  symbols  extend  beyond  their  semantics.  Put  differently,  the  
word  for  a  metaphor  is  λόγος,  whereas  the  word  for  an  authentic  symbol  is  rooted  both  in  βίος  and  
in   λόγος.   In   Ricoeur’s   words,   a   symbol   “testifies   to   the   primordial   rootedness   of   Discourse   in  
Life.”114  Ricoeur  maintains   that  authentic  symbols  relate   to  being   in  such  a  way  metaphors  never  
can,  as  they  are  “just  the  linguistic  surface  of  symbols.”115    
What,   then,   is   the   relationship   between   language   and   the   world,   given   that   Ricoeur’s  
conception  of  a  “full”  language  includes  the  idea  that  it  is  thoroughly  symbolic?116  As  mentioned  
above,  in  The  Living  Metaphor,  Ricoeur  defines  language  as  “that  which  raises  the  experience  of  the  
world   to   its   articulation   in   discourse,   that   which   founds   communication   and   brings   about   the  
advent  of  man  as  a  speaking  subject.”117  Language,  in  other  words,  articulates  being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world.  
Based   on  Ricoeur’s   thought,  Mary  Gerhart   argues   that   language   is   a  mediation   that   “integrates  
human   beings   into   society   and   assures   that   there   be   a   correspondence   between   language   and  
world.”118  Gerhart  emphasizes  both  the  societal  and  the  epistemic  aspects  of  language.  According  
to  Gerhart,  Ricoeur  understands  language  as  having  genuine  references  whenever  it  is  considered  
to  be  this  mediatory  function.119  The  notion  of  mediation  alone,  however,  does  not  fully  explicate  
Ricoeur’s  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  language  and  the  world.  
Ricoeur   clarifies   his   position   in   his   1995   reply   to   Gerhart.   The   background   for   this  
explanation   is   his   focus   on   “living   metaphors,”   i.e.,   on   those   expressions   that   reveal   a   new  
experience   of   being   by   taking   advantage   of   language’s   capability   to   create   new  meanings.   This  
semantic   innovation,   based   on   the   polysemic   character   of   language,   plays,   therefore,   a   key   role  
when  Ricoeur  states  that  the  “revelation”  in  poetic  language  exceeds  that  of  scientific  language.  It  
does  this,  however,  only  in  interpretation:  
If   semantic   innovation   is   related   to   these   three   [overlapping]  
disciplines   [rhetoric,   poetic,   and   hermeneutics],   it   remains   that  
rhetoric   is   marked   by   the   nature   of   the   effects   that   discourse  
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
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exerts  on   its   listeners,  whether   this  be   in   the   form  of  persuasion  
resulting   from   a   pleasing   discourse   or   in   that   of   conviction  
resulting   from   probable   arguments.   Poetry,   for   its   part,   unfolds  
between  two  poles  –  the  celebration  of  language  for  its  own  sake  
and   the   revelation   of   aspects   of   the   world   inaccessible   to   the  
language  of  empirical  observation  and  of   scientific   truth.   It   falls,  
therefore,  upon  hermeneutics  to  relate  the  intralinguistic  sense  of  
the  statement  to  the  extralinguistic  reference  that  opens  language  
upon  what  I  call  the  world  of  the  text.120  
In   brief,   the   extra-­‐‑linguistic   is   expressed   in   poetic   language   and   appropriated   in   interpretation.  
Still,  the  poetic  language  itself  “unfolds”;  that  is,  it  does  not  merely  mediate  but  reveals.  
With   respect   to   “the   ontology   induced   by   metaphorical   reference,”   the   post-­‐‑   Time   and  
Narrative  Ricoeur  brings  forth  the  role  of  the  “reader,”  i.e.,  the  role  of  an  experiencing  subject,  who  
interprets  his  own  being  while  expressing  it  –  consequently  considering  the  subject’s  own  life  as  a  
text.121  This   is  not,  however,   far   from  Ricoeur’s  hermeneutic  position   in  earlier   texts   such  as  The  
Symbolism   of   Evil,   On   Interpretation,   or   The   Living   Metaphor.   As   argued   by   all   these   works,   a  
hermeneutical   approach   should   be   accepted   once   and   for   all   in   the   case   of   symbols   and   living  
metaphors.  It  is  only  in  interpretation  that  the  ontological  becomes  attainable.  
This   ontologically   “restorative”   hermeneutics,   however,   is   grounded   in   the   possible  
intersection   of   the   speculative   and   poetic   discourses   and   in   the   ontological   clarification   of   the  
postulate   of   reference.   A   second   look   at   this   dialectic   is,   hence,   needed.   First,   the   idea   of  
intersecting  discourses,  the  dialectic  that  governs  both  the  speculative  and  the  poetic,  opens  up  the  
possibility   of   an   explicit   ontology   instead   of   an   implicit   one.122   For   Ricoeur,   this   movement   of  
making  the  ontological  apparent  implies  that  “the  passage  to  the  explicit  ontology  called  for  by  the  
postulate  of  reference  is  inseparable  from  the  passage  to  the  concept  called  for  by  the  structure  of  
meaning  found  in  the  metaphorical  statement.”123  This  interconnectedness  between  making  being  
explicit  and  a  metaphorical  expression   is  explained  by   the   fact   that  metaphor   itself  works  at   the  
very  intersection  of  speculative  and  poetic  discourses.124    
The   ontological   vehemence   of   language   triggers   the   intentional   interaction   of   these  
discordant   discourses   at   their   intersection.   Ricoeur   summarizes:   “An   experience   requests   to   be  
expressed.”125  The  speculative  discourse,  however,  grounds  the  metaphorical  one  by  opening  up  a  
horizon   in   which   the   aspects   of   “is”   and   “is   not”   of   the   “is   like”   become   articulated.   In   other  
words,   speculation   (intellectio)   is   required   for  poetic   language   (imaginatio).126  Would  Ricoeur  not,  
then,  indeed  be  saying  that  it  is  “the  horizon  of  speculative  λόόγος”  that  constitutes  the  plurivocal?  
This   is  not  Ricoeur’s   intention,  as  he  maintains   that  a  discourse  can  be  mixed  or  composite.  The  
idea  of  a  mixed  discourse,  however,  takes  us  back  to  the  level  of  interpretation:  “Interpretation  is  
…   a   mode   of   discourse   that   functions   at   the   intersection   of   two   domains,   metaphorical   and  
speculative.   It   is  a  composite  discourse  (un  discourse  mixte),   therefore,  and,  as  such,   it  cannot  but  
feel   the   opposite   pull   of   two   rival   demands.”127   The   intersection   of   speculative   and   poetic  
discourses   is   “located”   in   the   interpretation  of   statements   that   follow   the  metaphorical  mode  of  
expression.  
The   other   pole   of   the   dialectic,   however,   should   not   be   forgotten.   The   poetic   discourse  
differs   from   speculative   discourse   by   bringing   to   language   “a   pre-­‐‑objective  world   in  which  we  
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notion  of  the  world  is  inherently  important  because  it  functions  as  an  extra-­‐‑linguistic  referent  –  it  
is   the   correlate   of   signified  meaning.   As   such,   it   is   a   necessary   condition   for   the   possibility   of  
speech:  “We  must  thus  dismantle  the  reign  of  objects  in  order  to  let  be,  and  to  allow  to  be  uttered,  
our  primordial  belonging  to  a  world  which  we  inhabit,   that   is   to  say,  which  at  once  precedes  us  
and  receives   the   imprint  of  our  works   (nos  oeuvres).”129   In  short,   the  poetic  discourse  reveals  our  
being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world  while,  however,  being  also  “our  work.”  
This   duality   of   poetic   language   –   bringing   forth   the   world   while   giving   means   to  
expressing  our  belonging  to  it  –  becomes  apparent  only  through  the  aid  of  speculative  discourse.  
The   idea   of   such   a   poetic   discourse,   however,   brings   us   finally   to   the   threshold   of   the  
Hölderlinian-­‐‑Heideggerian   “Worte,   wie   Blumen,”   the   notion   of   words   as   flowers.130   Even   after  
having  followed  Ricoeur  from  his  very  early  works  to  the  final  study  of  The  Living  Metaphor,  it  is  
still   captivating   to   see   him   write   about   “the   ‘flowers’   of   our   words   …   utter   existence   in   its  
blossoming   forth.”131   Language   discloses   being   at   its   coming-­‐‑to-­‐‑presence.   Even   though   Ricoeur  
appears  to  be  close  to  this  style  of  thought,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  Ricoeur  was,  throughout  
his   career,   uncompromisingly   reserved   with   regard   to   Heidegger’s   ontological   hermeneutics.  
Heidegger’s  approach  appears  to  him  as  a  mere  inspiring  temptation.132  Being  reserved,  however,  
does  not  mean  that  Ricoeur  would  be  incapable  of  utilizing  Heidegger’s  later  texts  pedagogically.  
Heidegger  helps  Ricoeur  in  maintaining  that  language  is  ontologically  revealing.  
Ricoeur’s  understanding  of  poetic  language  is,  in  some  respects,  akin  to  that  of  Heidegger.  
In  The   Living  Metaphor,   for   example,   Ricoeur   seeks   support   for   the   view   that   it   is   acceptable   to  
comprehend   Heidegger’s   term   Ereignis   as   a   “philosopher’s   metaphor.”133   In   addition,   Ricoeur  
concludes  by  using  Heidegger’s  words  from  What   is  Philosophy?   (1956):  “Between  these  two  [viz.  
thinking   and   poetry,   i.e.,   speculation   and   poetics]   there   exists   a   secret   kinship   because   in   the  
service  of  language  both  intercede  on  behalf  of  language  and  give  lavishly  of  themselves.  Between  
both   there   is,  however,  at   the   same   time  an  abyss   for   they   ‘dwell  on   the  most  widely   separated  
mountains.’”134  This  notion  of  a  conflicting  kinship  brings  us,  for  the  last  time,  back  to  the  idea  of  a  
dialectic  that  governs  both  the  speculative  and  the  poetic.  Ricoeur  affirms  that  Heidegger’s  words  
capture   this   “very   dialectic   between   the  modes   of   discourse.”135   The   two   poles   of   this   dialectic  
must,  therefore,  be  reinvestigated,  now  keeping  in  mind  the  notion  of  the  ontological  clarification  
of  the  postulate  of  reference.  
The  poetic  pole  of  the  dialectic  sums  up  “all   the  forms  of  tensions,”  as  explicated  above.  
These  tensions  are  brought  together  “in  the  paradox  of  the  copula,  where  being-­‐‑as  signifies  being  
and   not   being.”136   In   other   words,   the   metaphoric   copula   expresses   being   while   resorting   to  
“being-­‐‑as.”  Ricoeur  argues  that  it  is,  therefore,  poetry  –  aided  by  the  speculative  discourse  –  which  
“articulates   and   preserves   the   experience   of   belonging   that   places   man   in   discourse   and   discourse   in  
being.”137   Poetry   explicates   the   human   condition   as   being-­‐‑in-­‐‑being   and   being-­‐‑in-­‐‑language.   The  
experience   of   “belonging”   is,   however,   made   apparent   in   a   critical,   speculative   distanciation.  
Without   the   speculative   distanciation,   the   poetic  would   remain   only   lived   and   not   understood.  
Ricoeur  maintains,   however,   that   this   critical   distanciation   is   not   foreign   to   the  poetic   but   quite  
natural   to   it:  “poetic  discourse,  as   text  and  as  work,  prefigures   the  distanciation  that  speculative  
thought  carries  to  its  highest  point  of  reflection.”138  The  being-­‐‑as  is  not  simply  “is”  but  is  tensional  
–  and,  therefore,  also  “is  not.”  
In   sum,   as  much   as   the   poetic   animates   speculative   reflection,   the   poetic   discourse   also  
depends  on  the  possibility  of  distanciation  provided  by  the  speculative.  These  two  are  not,   then,  
just   “the   most   widely   separated   mountains”   but   truly   have   “a   kinship.”   Ricoeur   concludes,  
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therefore,  that  the  “as  if”  grounds  our  experience  of  being  torn  between  life  and  thought:  “What  is  
given  to  thought  in  this  way  by  the  ‘tensional’  truth  of  poetry  is  the  most  primordial,  most  hidden  
dialectic  –  the  dialectic  that  reigns  between  the  experience  of  belonging  as  a  whole  and  the  power  
of  distanciation   that  opens  up  the  space  of  speculative   thought.”139  The  understanding   that   I  am  
alive  is  possible  only  by  maintaining  a  critical  distance  from  it.  Despite  Ricoeur’s  strong  objections,  
I  suggest  that  we  should  then  call  this  dialectic  of  being  “presencing  in  absensing,”  as  it  is  indeed  –  
to  use  the  words  of  Gert-­‐‑Jan  van  der  Heiden  –  “productive  distancing”  that  is  Ricoeur’s  focus.140  
Final  Reflections  
When  assessing  Ricoeur’s  poetics,  it  should  be  remembered  that  “the  poetics  of  will”  that  
Ricoeur  initially  aspired  to  in  The  Voluntary  and  the  Involuntary  was  defined  as  “suitable  to  the  new  
realities  [of  the  gift  of  being]  that  need  to  be  discovered.”141  Furthermore,  these  “new  realities”  are  
essentially  poetic  since  poetry  highlights  the  ontological  rootedness  of  the  human  will.  A  precise,  
speculative  description  does  not  yield  to  this  ontology  of  the  subject  because  it  neglects  the  aspect  
of  being  bound  by  being  while  being  in  being.  “There  remains  for  reflection  and  speculation  the  
inappropriable   character   of   the   source   of   life,”   argues   Ricoeur   once   again   in   one   of   his   late  
essays,142   emphasizing   that   speculation   is   unable   to   reveal   the   foundation   of   being.   In   brief,  
Ricoeur   recognizes   that   “there   is   a   ground   which   I   do   not   control.”143   He   argues,   therefore   –  
resorting  to  Heideggerian  language  –  that  “the  idea  of  the  groundless  ground,  the  foundation  in  
abyss,  remains  a  limit-­‐‑idea  for  understanding.”144  As  the  speculative  approach  does  not  reach  the  
level   of   existential   analysis,   our   primordial   relation   to   that   onto-­‐‑existential   foundation   can   be  
articulated   only   “within   a   framework   of   high   culture  …   in   what   I   would   call   a   poetics   of   the  
good.”145   Poetics   –   which   follows   Ricoeur   from   the   early   works   to   his   late   texts   –   reveals   the  
human  reality  of  being  in  being.  
Ricoeur  maintains  in  The  Voluntary  and  the  Involuntary  that  poetry  holds  the  first  place  in  
expressing   being.   It   is   “the   art   of   conjuring   up   the   world   as   created”   as   well   as   “the   order   of  
creation,”  and  its  analysis  is,  therefore,  worthy  of  being  called  “the  poetics  of  being.”146  When  this  
idea  is  read  in  connection  with  Ricoeur’s  later  texts,  has  Ricoeur  reached  the  level  of  Poetics  in  the  
manner  anticipated?  Although  not   infrequently   flirting  with   the   idea  of  ontological  expressivity,  
Ricoeur   still   claims   to   keep   himself   on   the   side   of   philosophical   reflection.   This   conviction,  
however,  leads  him  to  difficult-­‐‑to-­‐‑defend  assertions  such  as  ‘Ereignis  is  a  philosopher’s  metaphor  
and  not  a  poetic  one’  –  an  “event”  of  being  as  “enowing”  is  clearly  nothing  but  a  poetic  metaphor.  
Even   though   maintaining   that   the   “groundless   ground”   always   escapes   speculative  
understanding,  Ricoeur  himself  discusses  “a  semantic  event”  (un  événement  sémantique)  in  relation  
to   the  onto-­‐‑semantic   surplus.147   It   is   equally   true,  however,   that,  despite   aspiring   to   indicate   the  
same   groundless   ground   of   being   in   a   philosophical   manner,   Ricoeur   does   not   write   poetry  
himself  –  nevertheless,  his  key  phrase  is  poetics.148    
Even  if  Ricoeur  has  been  cautious  in  expressing  himself  poetically,  it  has  still  been  shown  
that  language  itself  maintains  its  rootedness  in  βίίος,  insofar  as  this  boundedness  is  understood  as  
an  ontological  necessity  that  is  the  condition  for  making  λόόγος  possible  in  the  first  place.149  After  
all,  it  is  λόόγος  –  thinking  and  saying  –  that  truly  gives  a  human  being  to  him-­‐‑  or  herself  through  
the   poetic   art   of   speech,   manifested   in   expressive   acts.   Ricoeur   argues   in   the   Fallible   Man   that  
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“Works”  of  art  and  literature,  and,  in  general,  works  of  the  mind  (les  
oeuvres   de   l’esprit),   insofar   as   they   do   not   merely   mirror   an  
environment  and  an  epoch  but  search  out  man’s  possibilities,  are  
the   true   “objects”   that   manifest   the   abstract   universality   of   the  
idea   of   humanity   through   their   concrete   universality.   …   Man,  
artisan,   artist,   legislator,   educator,   is   for   himself   incarnated  
because  the  Idea  (l’Idée)  is  in  itself  materialized.150    
While  expressing  himself,  a  subject  becomes  a  self-­‐‑conscious  being,  a  being  with  an  understanding  
of  being-­‐‑in-­‐‑being.  If  Ricoeur’s  expression  is  not  poetic,  it  draws  close  to  a  metaphysical  style.    
At   the   very   end   of   this   brief   study,   we   then   reach   the   final   frontier   of   language.   The  
“works  of  thought”  and  the  reflection  in  relation  to  them  reveal  “the  poetic  surplus  which  is  the  
treasury   of   spiritual   significations.”151   Ultimately,   although   indirectly,   Ricoeur   talks   of  
“foundational  excess,”  that  is,  of  “superabundance.”152  According  to  Ricoeur  in  The  Voluntary  and  
the   Involuntary,   the   subject’s   “poetic   sensitivity”   rediscovers   “the   ‘spirit   of   the   song   beneath   the  
text  which  leads  divination  from  here  to  there’.”153  A  question  remains,  however:  why  couldn’t  it  
then  be  argued  that  this  same  “sensitivity”  leads  Ricoeur  in  The  Living  Metaphor  to  recognize  that  
“the   philosopher’s   metaphors   may   well   resemble   those   of   the   poet”?   That   their   difference   is  
“infinitesimal”?154   Finding   that   these   poetic   works   bear   witness   to   this   treasure   of   “belonging-­‐‑
here”   as   much   as   “belonging-­‐‑there,”   a   capable   human   being   has   entered   into   the   “concrete  
reflection”   of   the   “Poetics   of   being.”   This   Poetics   goes   well   beyond   the   analyses   in   Time   and  
Narrative   by   opening   a  proper   view   to   the   “alethic”  understanding  of   ontological   attestation,   as  
well   as   to   the   hyperbolic   “excess”   in   the   face   of   the   Other.155   For   a   philosopher,   this   mystery  
becomes  problematic   –   it   turns   to   speculation   that   concerns   the  “as   if.”   Indeed,  with   the  ethico-­‐‑
theological   “aporia   of   the  Other,”  Ricoeur  writes   in  Oneself   as  Another,   “philosophical   discourse  
comes  to  an  end.”156  
  
  
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          




1 A shorter version of this text was presented at the Society for Ricoeur Studies conference in Philadelphia, 
PA (October 22-23, 2011). I thank Richard Kearney, John Starkey, Cristina Bucur, and especially 
Dagmar Van Engen for their comments to the earlier versions of this paper. Research for this 
publication was funded by The Finnish Cultural Foundation. 
2 Paul Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, L'ordre philosophique (Paris: Seuil, 1983), 76. (45). – As the translations 
are occasionally modified (especially with regard to Le volontaire et l’involontaire, La symbolique du 
mal, and De l’interprétation), references are given to original French texts. References to the 
corresponding English translations of the works are given in brackets. 
3 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 87-88, 116-117. (54, 76-77). 
4 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 101, 103. (64, 66). 
5 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 102-103. (6566). 
6 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 66-67, 101. (38-39, 65). 
7 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 71, 112. (42, 73). 
8 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 111. (72). 
9 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 110-111. (70-71). – Cf. Paul Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, Philosophie de la 
volonté 2: finitude et culpabilité I (Paris: Aubier, 1960), 57. (39); Martin Heidegger, Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics, 5th ed., Studies in Continental Thought (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1997), 141. (§35). 
10 Ricoeur defines the term “fiction” in a manner similar to literary criticism. In short, the word “fiction” 
designates “the configuration of a narrative for which emplotment is the paradigm,” and it therefore 
covers both fictional and historical narratives. Cf. Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 101. (64). 
11 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 111. (72). 
12 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 111-113, 116. (72-73, 76). 
13 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 117. (77). 
14 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 87-88. (54). 
15 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 117-118. (77). 
16 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 118. (78). 
17 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 118-119. (78). 
18 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 119. (78). 
19 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 121. (80). 
20 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 121. (80). 
21 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 121. (80). 
22 Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 121. (80). 
23 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, L'ordre philosophique (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 347-351. (299-
302). Marc-Antoine Vallée criticizes Ricoeur for arguing a modest “regional” ontology. Cf. Marc-Antoine 
Vallée, "Quelle sorte d’être est le soi? Les implications ontologiques d’une herméneutique du soi," 
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 1, no. 1 (2010): 35, 42. In light of Ricoeur’s earlier works that 
are assumed as the basis for Ricoeur’s argument in Oneself as Another, however, Vallée’s comments 






Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





24 Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 1977. Ricoeur points out to the importance of the original French title in 
a 1981 interview with Richard Kearney: “In La métaphore vive I tried to show how language could 
extend itself to its very limits forever discovering new resonances within itself. The very term vive 
(living) in the title of this work is all-important, for it was my purpose to demonstrate that there is not 
just an epistemological and political imagination, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, a 
linguistic imagination which generates and regenerates meaning through the living power of 
metaphoricity.” Cf. Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: the Owl of Minerva, Transcending boundaries in 
philosophy and theology (Aldershot, Hants, England, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2004), 127. The 
title The Living Metaphor is therefore used.  
25 Paul Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l’involontaire, trans. Freedom and Nature (by Erazim V. Kohák, 1966). F.D. 
Vansina’s well known bibliography has long insisted that Le volontaire et l’involontaire was published in 
1950. The library copy at the Boston College O’Neill Library, however, lists the following: “Achevé 
d’imprimer par A.Taffin-Lefort, imprimeur a Lille, pour M.F. Aubier, éditions Montaigne, a Paris – en 
octobre MCMXLIX – Imp. no 24-4-49. No d’ordre 684. Dépôt legal: 4e trim. 1949.”  
26 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 449. (478). 
27 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 443. (471). 
28 E.g. Paul Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, Philosophie de la volonté 2: finitude et culpabilité II (Paris: 
Aubier, 1960), 304, 306. (327, 329). 
29 Cf. Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 399, 445. (425, 473).; Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 11-15, 
292, 304. (3-7, 313-314, 328). 
30 Cf. Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 449. (478). Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, 44-45. (26-27). 
31 Cf. Richard Kearney, Poetics of Imagining: Modern to Postmodern, Second, rev. and enl. ed., 
Perspectives in continental philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 143. 
32 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 25. (19). 
33 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 20. (13). 
34 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 21. (14). 
35 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: On Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (1970). In this essay, the 
title On Interpretation is used. 
36 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 20. (13). 
37 Paul Ricoeur, De l'interprétation: essai sur Freud (Paris: Seuil, 1965), 24-25. (16). Italics added. 
38 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 20-21. (13) 
39 Cf. Aristotle, "The Complete Works" (Clayton, Ga: InteLex Corporation, 1992), 6-25. 
40 Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, 54. (37). 
41 Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, 50-51. (32). 
42 Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, 50. (32). “Dans ‘Socrates est assis’ le verbe c’est le bloc ‘est assis’ c’est set 
ensemble qui sur-signifie (consignificat, dit saint Thomas) le temps.” 
43 Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, 152. (136). 
  
  
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





44 Mary Gerhart, "The Live Metaphor," in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago 
and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995), 216. 
45 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 388-390. (413-415). 
46 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 324-326, 330. (348-351, 355).; Ricoeur, De l'interprétation: essai sur 
Freud, 13. (3). Cf. also Paul Ricoeur, "Existence et herméneutique," Dialogue 4, no. 1 (1965): 1-11. 
(3-11). 
47 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 331-332. (356-357). 
48 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 331. (356). 
49 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 331. (356). 
50 Paul Ricoeur, La métaphore vive (Paris: Seuil, 1975), 386. (304). 
51 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 385. (304). 
52 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 7, 10. (3, 5-6). 
53 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 161-171. (125-133). 
54 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 217. (170). 
55 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 167. (130). – As much as there is a “play” in the copula, and a play 
between the word and the sentence, there is also a “play” played by a poet; “[a poet] is that artisan 
who sustains and shapes imaginary only by a play of language (le seul jeu du langage).” Cf. Ricoeur, 
La métaphore vive, 167, 268. (130, 211).; Ricoeur, De l'interprétation: essai sur Freud, 167. (165). 
This notion can be taken as being inspired by Kant’s third Critique and the ‘free play of imagination’,” 
which is an aspect of Kant’s thought Richard Kearney highlights. Cf. Richard Kearney, The Wake of 
Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 172. 
56 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 127. (98). 
57 Cf. Plato, Meno, 79e-80b. 
58 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 168. (131). 
59 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 238-242. (187-191). Cf. also Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 239, 250-251. 
(188, 196-197).; Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers. Elements of Logic, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. 
Weiss, vol. II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), 157.  
60 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 269. (212). 
61 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 268. (211). Cf. Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 20-21. (13-14).; Ricoeur, 
De l'interprétation: essai sur Freud, 24-25. (15-16). 
62 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 268-271. (212-214).; Ricoeur, Temps et récit 1, 117, 121. (77, 80). 
63 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 271-272. (213-215).; Ricoeur, De l'interprétation: essai sur Freud, 59-60. 
(52-54). 
64 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 272. (215). Cf. also Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 20. (13).; Ricoeur, De 
l'interprétation: essai sur Freud, 24. (15-16). 
65 Kearney, Poetics of Imagining: Modern to Postmodern, 149, 160. 






Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





67 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 301. (239). 
68 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 11. (7). 
69 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 302. (240). 
70 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 311. (247). 
71 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 311. (247). 
72  Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 311. (247). 
73 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 11. (7). – The English translation of La symbolique du mal (The Symbolism 
of Evil) translates the French word “le verbe” with the English word “word.” Cf. Ricoeur, La symbolique 
du mal, 20. (13). This is also the case in De l’interprétation (On Interpretation, transl. by Denis 
Savage) in which there is a similar failure to capture the intended meaning. Cf. Ricoeur, De 
l'interprétation: essai sur Freud, 24-25. (15-16). When the above cited passage from The Living 
Metaphor is taken into account, these untoward choices disguise the original argument in an 
unfortunate manner. 
74 Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, 54. (37). 
75 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 313. (249). 
76 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 311. (247-248). 
77 Cf. Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 331. (356). 
78 Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, 32-34, 347-351. (20-21, 299-302). 
79 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 310-313, 321. (247-249, 255-256). 
80 Eugene F. Kaelin, "Paul Ricoeur’s Aesthetics: On How to Read a Metaphor," in The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995), 246. 
81 Kaelin, "Paul Ricoeur’s Aesthetics: On How to Read a Metaphor," 246. 
82 Cf. Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 324-374. (258-295). 
83 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 374. (295). 
84 Kaelin, "Paul Ricoeur’s Aesthetics: On How to Read a Metaphor," 255. n31. 
85 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 374-375. (295). 
86 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 376. (297). 
87 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 377-379. (298-300). 
88 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 379. (300). 
89 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 385. (304). 
90 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 385. (304). 
91 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 385. (304). 
92 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 385. (304). 
93 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 385. (304). 
  
  
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





94 Cf. Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 295. (234). 
95 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 386. (304). 
96 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 388-389. (306-307).  
97 Cf. Gerhart, "The Live Metaphor," 223-224.; Paul Ricoeur, "Reply to Mary Gerhart," in The Philosophy of 
Paul Ricoeur, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, The Library of Living Philosophers (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: 
Open Court, 1995), 234. 
98 David Pellauer, "The Symbol Gave Rise to Thought," in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. Lewis Edwin 
Hahn, The Library of Living Philosophers (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995), 106. 
99 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 389-390. (307). 
100 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 389. (307). 
101 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 398-399. (313). 
102 Cf. Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 388-393. (307-309).; Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
154-157. (§40). 
103 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 18, 456. (15, 485-486).; Marcel, The Philosophy of 
Existentialism, 21, 35-36. Cf. also Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1962), 119-121, 139. 
104 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 326. (351).; Ricoeur, De l'interprétation: essai sur Freud, 61-63. (54-
56). 
105 Gert-Jan van der Heiden, The Truth (and Untruth) of Language: Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida on 
Disclosure and Displacement (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 2010), 148-149. 
106 Kearney, Poetics of Imagining: Modern to Postmodern, 149. Cf. also Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 127, 
370, 384. (99, 291, 303). 
107 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 61. (43). “L’expression vive est ce qui dit l’existence vive.” 
108 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 61. (43).; Heiden, The Truth (and Untruth) of Language, 145. 
109 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 456. (486). 
110 Cf. Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 378. (299).; Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 17. (9-10). – In The 
Symbolism of Evil Ricoeur asserts that there are three connected forms of symbols: primary (double-
intentional signs), secondary (myths), and tertiary (rational speculation). Hierarchically, these “tertiary 
symbols” are in continuity with the primary and secondary symbols, but in distinction to them, they do 
not have an independent symbolic function. Although they are not - strictly speaking - symbols 
anymore, Ricoeur still sees them as remaining within the extended field of symbols. These tertiary 
symbols, “rational symbols,” are concepts with an analogical meaning that refers to mythical language. 
This can also be stated in return: mythical language leads to rationalizing speculation.  
111 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 17. (9-10). 
112 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, Texas: The 
Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 46. 
113 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 60-63. Cf. also Paul Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations: essais 






Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





114 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 59. 
115 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 69. 
116 Ricoeur, La symbolique du mal, 324-325. (349). 
117 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 385. (304). 
118 Gerhart, "The Live Metaphor," 223. 
119 Gerhart, "The Live Metaphor," 223. 
120 Ricoeur, "Reply to Mary Gerhart," 234. 
121 Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, 180-193. (152-163). 
122 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 375. (296). 
123 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 376. (297). 
124 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 212, 377. (166, 298). 
125 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 378-379. (298, 300). 
126 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 381. (301). 
127 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 383. (303). Cf. also Gerhart, "The Live Metaphor," 225. 
128 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 387. (306). 
129 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 387. (306). 
130 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 392. (309). Cf. also Heiden, The Truth (and Untruth) of Language, 145-
148. 
131 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 392. (309). 
132 Cf. e.g. Ricoeur, Le conflit des interprétations: essais d'herméneutique, 23-28. (19-24).; Ricoeur, La 
métaphore vive, 393. (309). Cf. also Paul Ricoeur, "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, 
Imagination, and Feeling," Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978): 158. 
133 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 394-395. (310). 
134 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 398. (313). 
135 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 398. (313). 
136 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 398. (313).  
137 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 398. (313). Italics added. 
138 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 398-399. (313). 
139 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 399. (313). 
140 Cf. Heiden, The Truth (and Untruth) of Language, 72-73, 76, 152. Gert-Jan van der Heiden summarizes 
Ricoeur’s affinity with Heidegger’s in-der-Welt-sein as follows: “Poetic language is the medium of 
understanding our being-in-the-world par excellence.” (Heiden, The Truth (and Untruth) of Language, 
84.) In Heiden’s related analysis, however, the notion of fiction (taken as the “is-not” aspect of “as if”) 
seems to be stressed in such a manner that it threatens to leave the “is” aspect of “as if” aside quite 
completely. Heiden understands that in distanciation the experienced “everyday world” is suspended. 
  
  
“As  If”  and  the  Surplus  of  Being  in  Ricoeur’s  Poetics  
  
  
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          





The poetic task of language is, however, not only to describe an imaginary world, i.e., that of 
possibilities, but precisely to understand the living experience of the world (the “is”). It is this 
distanciation in language that Ricoeur discusses in relation to “is not” – and not a literary genre of 
fiction which only highlights this dimension of “alienation.” Heiden is thus correct when he later states 
(Heiden, The Truth (and Untruth) of Language, 140.): “the genuine concern of poetics is not language 
as such but rather the disclosure of our own existence.” For Ricoeur, poetics reveals a surplus of being. 
141 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 32. (30). 
142 Paul Ricoeur, "Religious Belief: The Difficult Path of the Religious," in A Passion for the Possible: 
Thinking with Paul Ricoeur, ed. Brian Treanor and Henry Isaac Venema, Perspectives in Continental 
Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 37.  
143 Ricoeur, "Religious Belief: The Difficult Path of the Religious," 39. Cf. also Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un 
autre, 357, 364-365. (308, 314-315). 
144 Ricoeur, "Religious Belief: The Difficult Path of the Religious," 37.   
145 Ricoeur, "Religious Belief: The Difficult Path of the Religious," 37.   
146 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 32-35, 443. (30-33, 471). Cf. also Heiden, The Truth (and 
Untruth) of Language, 84-86.  
147 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 127. (98).; Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 9-12. Cf. also Heiden, The 
Truth (and Untruth) of Language, 75-78.  
148 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, L'ordre philosophique (Paris: Seuil, 2000), 657. (506). 
149 Cf. Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, 148. (132).; Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 69. 
150 Ricoeur, L'homme faillible, 139, 157. (123, 141). Italics added. 
151 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 381. (406). Italics added. 
152 Ricoeur, "Religious Belief: The Difficult Path of the Religious," 36. 
153 Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 381. (405). 
154 Ricoeur, La métaphore vive, 394-395. (310). 
155 Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, 33-35, 347-348, 388-393. (21-23, 299-300, 337-341). 
156 Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, 409. (355).  
